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INTRODUCTION
The legal theory of contributory copyright infringement requires a
balancing of the competing interests of copyright holders and society.
When a company distributes a product or service capable of both legal
and illegal uses, the copyright holders seek broad enforcement of their
rights and the distributors seek absolution based on the public benefits
derived from the technological innovation.2 The Supreme Court, in an
1
The term “grok” was coined by the author Robert Heinlein in the science fiction
novel Stranger in a Strange Land; it means “to understand thoroughly and intuitively.”
WEBSTER’S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 842
(1996).
†
J.D. candidate 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, University
of Georgia; B.S., 2003, University of Georgia. The author extends her special thanks to
Professor Jake Barnes for his ideas and contributions to the composition of this comment.
Also, she would like to thank her family and, in particular, Liam Holland and Christopher
Miller for their support and inspiration during the writing process
2
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003).
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effort to balance these competing interests, has stated that the distributor
of a product or service capable of substantial noninfringing uses is not
liable as a contributory infringer; however, that seminal decision is laden
with cumbersome language.3 In recent years, the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits split regarding certain aspects of the Sony rule.4 Despite the
opportunity to clarify the rule and resolve that circuit split, the Supreme
Court sidestepped the issue entirely.5 Instead, the Court created a new
rule that holds companies liable for purposely encouraging
infringement.6 Already, lower courts have applied the Grokster
inducement rule.7 It is only a matter of time before another case
involving new technology requires a clarification of Sony in order to
strike a balance between the interests of society and copyright holders.
By applying tort law reasoning to the theory of contributory
copyright infringement, this comment clarifies the Sony rule for the
lower courts.8 Contributory copyright infringement is a tort; thus, tort
law principles should apply.9 The Restatement bifurcates the intent
requirement in tort law,10 just as Sony and Grokster bifurcate the intent
requirement for contributory copyright infringement.11 Although the
Court’s cumbersome language in Sony has created a circuit split, it does
so in an effort to articulate a substantial certainty limitation.12 In some
instances, such as the one at issue in Sony, the Court will limit a
company’s liability if the product it distributes has substantial
noninfringing uses.13 The exact definition of the word “substantial” has

3

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649 (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1
(2d ed. 2003)); MGM Studios, Inc v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 n.9 (9th Cir.
2004) [hereinafter Grokster I].
5
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2778-79 (2005) [hereinafter
Grokster].
6
Id. at 2779.
7
See MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp.
2d 877 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
8
For further discussion of the application of tort law principles to secondary liability
in copyright law, see the works of Professors Yen and Barnes. See David W. Barnes, An
Alternative Torts Model of Secondary Copyright Liability, 55 CASE. W. RES. 867 (2005);
see also Alfred C. Yen, Law, Technology & the Arts Symposium: “Copyright and
Personal Copying: Sony v. Universal Studios Twenty-one Years Later”: Sony, Tort
Doctrines, and the Puzzle of Peer-to-Peer, 55 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 815 (2005).
9
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
10
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
11
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
12
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
13
Id.
4

2006] Substantial Certainty in Contributory Copyright Infringement 593
proved problematic for plaintiffs as well as the lower courts.14 This
comment argues that the Court’s language in Sony actually incorporates
the Restatement’s suggestions regarding substantial certainty in
intentional torts. In the comments accompanying section one of the Third
Restatement, the drafters recommend a balancing test as a limitation on
liability despite a substantial certainty that harm will occur.15 The
reasoning behind that recommendation mirrors the language in Sony.16
Thus, an application of the substantial certainty limitation of intentional
tort liability to contributory copyright infringement cases will provide the
balance between the progress of technology and the rights of copyright
holders sought by Sony and, ultimately, entrusted to the determination of
the lower courts.
Part I provides a detailed review of the relevant case law,
particularly the Supreme Court’s opinions in both Sony and Grokster.
This section states the governing rules and discusses the diverging circuit
court opinions. Part I also highlights the Court’s determination to balance
the interests of copyright holders against the public’s interest in
technological innovation. This section provides the background
information necessary to understand subsequent sections.
Part II expounds upon the dual objectives of copyright law and
discusses its origins in the Constitution. This section also discusses the
links between contributory infringement and tort law. That theory
“originates in tort law and stems from the notion that one who directly
contributes to another’s infringement should be held accountable.”17
However, when a product or service is capable of lawful and illegal uses,
the “Sony[] rule limits imputing [the] culpable intent” to commit
contributory infringement based on product distribution.18 Since its
pronouncement, the Sony rule has caused a great deal of difficulty. The
circuits have split regarding their interpretation of the Sony rule; the
Supreme Court refused to provide guidance for the lower courts.19 The
tort law definition of intent provides the much-needed clarity.
Part III clarifies the Sony rule. The first sub-section discusses the
Restatement’s approach to intent in tort law and applies that principle to
contributory copyright infringement. In particular, the Restatement
explains that “[a] person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if:
(a) The person has the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) The
14
15
16
17
18
19

Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779.
Id.
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person knows to a substantial certainty that the consequence will ensue
from the person’s conduct.”20 Similarly, Sony and Grokster provide two
situations in which a defendant may possess the intent to commit
contributory infringement.21 The Restatement also makes many careful
qualifications concerning its definition. As evinced by the Sony
litigation, despite knowledge to a substantial certainty, a defendant “may
be engaging in a generally proper activity for generally proper reasons,
even though the activity produces harm as an unavoidable but unwanted
byproduct.”22 In those situations, the Restatement limits liability unless
the defendant has a substantial certainty that his conduct will affect a
particular victim or those contained in a small class of victims within a
localized area.23 The Restatement also provides specific examples of
industries that qualify for the substantial certainty limitation.24
Those industrial examples support the argument that the substantial
certainty limitation actually creates a balancing test for the protection and
promotion of industries serving the public good. In addition, the
limitation is inspired, at least in part, by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts’ discussion of negligence.25 Prior to the Restatement, the courts
considered this balancing test to be good public policy. The courts have
applied this test in the context of the railroad industry, an example
enumerated in the Restatement. In those instances, the social benefits
derived from that industry outweigh the harmful consequences of
operating a railroad. Thus, the substantial certainty limitation applies
when a defendant’s (an industry or software provider) conduct provides a
net social benefit despite a substantial certainty of some harmful
consequences.
A desire to punish the guilty, rather than the knowing, justifies the
substantial certainty limitation. Although companies do not desire their
railroads to cause serious bodily injury, such injuries will likely occur
regardless. Despite knowledge, the company lacks a subconscious,
blameworthy intent. On the other hand, if a company knows to a
substantial certainty that its business will cause the serious injury or
death of an employee, “a particular victim, or . . . someone within a small
class of potential victims within a localized area,”26 that company is
liable, because its knowledge is not general but reveals a more blame20
21
22
23
24
25
26

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1.
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780; Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e.

2006] Substantial Certainty in Contributory Copyright Infringement 595
worthy mental state. Thus, the substantial certainty limitation ensures
that only those people/entities that demonstrate a clear intent (established
by their purpose or knowledge) will face liability.
The last sub-section explains that the substantial certainty limitation
provides a point of balance between the interests of copyright owners
and the public’s interest in technological innovation. When applying the
Restatement’s theory of intent, as well as its limitations to contributory
copyright infringement, two scenarios result in liability. One represents
Grokster and occurs when an entity purposefully induces copyright
infringement. The second scenario represents Sony and occurs when an
entity distributes a product (or provides a service) capable of infringing
and noninfringing uses. In the latter instance, the substantial certainty
limitation focuses liability on entities with a culpable state of mind.
Application of the substantial certainty limitation requires two steps.
First, the court must ask if “the defendant has knowledge to a substantial
certainty that [its] conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or
to someone within a small class of potential victims.”27 If the answer is
yes, the defendant will face liability based on its intent to cause harm. If
the answer is no, the court must balance the social benefits derived from
the product against the harm it produces. If the product or service creates
a net social benefit, the court should limit liability: society’s interest in
technological innovation is served. If the product or service does not, the
court will impose liability: copyright holders are protected. Thus, the
substantial certainty limitation clarifies the Sony rule and helps the courts
balance artists’ and society’s competing interests.
I. CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT: REVIEW OF THE
RELEVANT CASE LAW
Because the subsequent discussion of contributory copyright
infringement requires a detailed understanding of the relevant case law,
this section provides a review of the two most influential Supreme Court
decisions on the subject as well as a discussion of the current circuit split.
In 1984, the Supreme Court faced a challenging issue: when is the
distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful uses liable
for contributory copyright infringement? A deeply divided Court ruled
that the distributor of a product capable of substantial noninfringing uses
is not liable.28 The rule proved troublesome as technology advanced. The
Seventh and Ninth Circuits split regarding their interpretation of the rule
and each issued opinions criticizing the other. Then approximately
27
28

Id.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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twenty years after the Court issued the Sony rule, the Supreme Court
faced the issue once again. However, rather than clarify the Sony rule,
the Court issued a new rule: one who purposefully induces infringement
is a contributory copyright infringer.29 The Court neither clarified the
Sony rule nor addressed the contentious circuit split. Subsequent sections
of this comment provide a clarification, based on those two rules. Thus,
further discussion requires a thorough understanding of contributory
copyright infringement jurisprudence.
A. The Betamax Case
When Sony released its Betamax video-recorder (“VCR”) the
copyright holders of many television programs, viewed the change as an
abrogation of their rights.30 As a result, Universal Studios and other
copyright holders (plaintiffs) brought an action for contributory
copyright infringement against Sony in a California district court in
1976.31 The plaintiffs argued that Sony, because of its product marketing
and distribution, was responsible for the direct infringement of its users,
who copied their television programs without authorization.32 The district
court ruled in favor of Sony, because the company had no direct
involvement with the purchasers and the company’s advertising did not
induce such infringement.33 Though “[t]he District Court assumed that
Sony had constructive knowledge of the probability that the [VCR] . . .
would be used to record copyrighted programs, [it] found that Sony
merely sold a ‘product capable of a variety of uses, some of them
allegedly infringing.’”34 The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s final
judgment.35 Since the VCR was sold for the exclusive purpose of
reproducing television programs, which are typically copyrighted, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the VCR did not have substantial
noninfringing uses.36 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court’s
reasoning regarding Sony’s lack of knowledge “because the reproduction
29

Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420 (majority opinion).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 426.
34
Id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429,
461 (C.D. Cal. 1979)). According to user surveys, most users primarily employed the
VCR for “time-shifting,” which “is the practice of recording a program to view it once at
a later time, and thereafter erasing it.” Id. at 423. However, a substantial number of users
also employed the VCR as a means of accumulating libraries of videotaped
programming. Id. at 423. Sony also warned its customers, by way of the Betamax
instruction manual, about videotaping copyrighted material. Id. at 426.
35
Id. at 427.
36
Id. at 428.
30
31
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of copyrighted materials was either ‘the most conspicuous use’ or ‘the
major use’ of the . . . product.”37 The Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari.38
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion addresses the major concerns of
copyright law and offers an equitable conclusion for the Sony issue. In
particular, Justice Stevens provides a detailed overview of copyright law,
its origins and applications, as well as a thoughtful summary of the
relationship between copyright law and technology.39 The majority also
speaks of policy, specifically “[t]he judiciary’s reluctance to expand the
protections afforded by the copyright without explicit legislative
guidance.”40 Of course, the Court issued a caveat: when Congress has not
spoken, the courts must balance the competing interests of the copyright
holder and the public.41 Sony was such an instance of congressional
silence.42 Therefore, the Court modified a rule from patent law to reflect
the unique concerns of copyright law: “the sale of copying equipment . . .
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be
capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”43
Once the Court established this new rule, it applied the facts of the
44
case. First, Justice Stevens explained that authorized time-shifting is
noninfringing, fair use of copyrighted material; thus, it “plainly satisfies
[the] standard.”45 The majority also found that “the evidence concerning
‘sports, religious, educational and other programming’ . . . establish[ed] a
significant quantity of broadcasting whose copying is now authorized,
37

Id. (quoting Universal City Studios Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976
(9th Cir. 1982)).
38
Id. at 420.
39
Id. at 428-30. Indeed, “[t]he fortunes of the law of copyright have always been
closely connected with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological
improvements in means of dissemination, on the other.” Id. at 430 n.12 (quoting B.
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (Columbia University Press 1967)).
40
Id. at 431.
41
Id. at 432.
42
Id. at 434-35. The Copyright Act does not expressly define contributory
infringement. Id. at 434.
43
Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
44
Id. The majority opinion becomes confusing once the Court applied the rule to the
facts. As Justice Stevens notes, “we need only consider whether on the basis of the facts .
. . a significant number of [the product’s potential uses] would be noninfringing.” Id. at
442 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun articulates similar language in his dissenting
opinion: “if a significant portion of the product’s use is noninfringing, the manufacturers
and sellers cannot be held contributorily liable for the product’s infringing uses.” Id. at
491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The subtle differences between the
majority and the dissent in Sony may have led to the subsequent circuit split as different
judges emphasized different language.
45
Id. at 442-43.
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and a significant potential for future authorized copying.”46 In light of
these facts, the Court ultimately found the VCR capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.47
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Marshall, Powell, and
Rehnquist joined, composed a separate dissent.48 After a detailed review
of copyright law and the doctrine of fair use,49 Justice Blackmun
considered the claim of contributory copyright infringement.50 In
response to the lower courts’ rulings, Justice Blackmun noted that “a
finding of contributory infringement has never depended on actual
knowledge of particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the
defendant have reason to know that infringement is taking place.”51
Justice Blackmun explained that indirect evidence that Sony caused,
induced, or contributed to the direct infringement of the plaintiffs’
copyrights was sufficient.52 Still, the dissent recognized the need to
protect certain technology from the chilling effects of over-broad
copyright laws.53 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that,
if a significant portion of the product’s use is noninfringing, the
manufacturers and sellers cannot be held contributorily liable for
the product’s infringing uses. If virtually all of the product’s use,
however, is to infringe, contributory liability may be imposed; if
no one would buy the product for noninfringing purposes alone,
it is clear that the manufacturer is purposely profiting from the
infringement, and that liability is appropriately imposed. In such
a case . . . the manufacturer of such a product contributes to the
infringing activities of others and profits directly thereby, while
providing no benefit to the public sufficient to justify the
infringement.54

Below, the Ninth Circuit applied this rule.55 However, the district
court failed to make factual findings regarding the amount of infringing
VCR usage.56 Thus, Justice Blackmun, unlike the majority, “would
remand the case for further consideration.”57
46

Id. at 444.
Id. at 456.
48
Id. at 457 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
49
Id. at 457-86.
50
Id. at 486-90.
51
Id. at 487.
52
Id. at 489-90. “Sony’s advertisements, at various times, have suggested that
Betamax users ‘record favorite shows’ or ‘build a library.’” Id. at 459.
53
Id. at 491.
54
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
55
Id. at 492.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 493.
47
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The Sony decision is anything but clear. First, a deeply divided
Court delivered the Sony rule. The majority issued the substantial
noninfringing uses test58 and the dissent argued for a significant
noninfringing uses test.59 Then, the majority blurred the line between the
two tests when it applied the Sony rule and asked whether the VCR had
significant noninfringing uses.60 Because of this awkward diction, the
circuit courts have had difficulty interpreting the rule.
B. The Unresolved Circuit Split: Aimster and Grokster
As technology advanced, the application of the Sony rule proved
difficult for the lower courts. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the
record companies sued the notorious Napster for contributory copyright
infringement.61 Napster allowed users to share MP3 music files via peerto-peer (P2P) software.62 In order to access Napster, however, users had
to install the Napster software and log into the system with a user name
and password.63 When it applied the Sony rule, the Ninth Circuit noted
that “[t]he record support[ed] the . . . finding that Napster ha[d] actual
knowledge that specific infringing material [wa]s available using its
system, that it could block access to the system by suppliers of the
infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material.”64 After
Napster, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of the Sony rule
diverged. The diverging opinions developed into a contentious circuit
split with each circuit criticizing the other. In 2005, approximately
twenty years after Sony, the Supreme Court faced the issue once again.
However, the Court avoided the obvious need to clarify the Sony rule and
issued a new rule: one who purposefully induces infringement is a
contributory copyright infringer.65 The Court failed to address the circuit
split. Subsequent sections of this comment provide a clarification of
58
59
60
61
62

Id.

63
64
65

Id. at 442 (majority opinion).
Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 442 (majority opinion).
239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. As the Ninth Circuit explained:
MPEG-3 [files], abbreviated as “MP3” . . . are created through a process
colloquially called “ripping.” Ripping software allows a computer owner to
copy an audio compact disk (“audio CD”) directly onto a computer’s hard
drive by compressing the audio information on the CD into the MP3 format.
The MP3’s compressed format allows for rapid transmission of digital audio
files from one computer to another by electronic mail or any other file
transfer protocol.
Id.
Id. at 1022.
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
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contributory copyright infringement based on the two relevant Supreme
Court rules. Therefore, this section will address the circuit split, which
led to the Supreme Court’s holding in Grokster.
1. Aimster66
Although the record companies successfully shut down Napster in
2001, the issue surrounding the Sony interpretation lived on.67 Other P2P
networks picked up where Napster left off and the record companies
commenced new litigation. At first glance, Aimster appears to be yet
another Napster-esque case, where the recording industry sued the
provider of free music downloading software controlled by a centralized
computer server.68 However, Aimster’s divergence from Napster created
the circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.69 Judge Posner
delivered the opinion of the court, which eloquently discussed the Sony
rule as it applied to the Aimster software.70 In so doing, Judge Posner
diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and qualified the
protection offered by the Sony rule.71
In its effort to enjoin Aimster, the Seventh Circuit departed from
Napster and limited Sony. The court noted that software providers that
utilize a centralized server maintain a (limited) relationship with their
66
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (addressing the
district court’s ruling, which imposed a preliminary injunction against Aimster).
67
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-0518, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2186
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001) (enjoining Napster from continuing its operation of copying,
transmitting, downloading, uploading, or otherwise distributing copyrighted works).
68
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 645-46. Judge Posner explains:
The Aimster system has the following essential components: proprietary
software that can be downloaded free of charge from Aimster’s Web site;
Aimster’s server (a server is a computer that provides services to other
computers, in this case personal computers owned or accessed by Aimster’s
users, over a network), which hosts the Web site and collects and organizes
information obtained from the users but does not make copies of the
swapped files themselves and that also provides the matching service
described below; computerized tutorials instructing users of the software on
how to use it for swapping computer files; and “Club Aimster,” a related
Internet service owned by Deep that users of Aimster’s software can join for
a fee and use to download the “top 40” popular-music files more easily than
by using the basic, free service. The “AIM” in “Aimster” stands for AOL
instant-messaging service.
Id. at 646.
69
Id. at 649 (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)).
(“We . . . agree with Professor Goldstein that the Ninth Circuit erred in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001), in suggesting that actual
knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a
contributory infringer.”).
70
Id. at 647-51.
71
Id. at 648-53.
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users, unlike Sony.72 Judge Posner reasoned that the continued
relationship and the ability to police the habits of users should be a factor
in determining contributory liability.73 Similarly, the court held that
“[w]illful blindness is knowledge”; thus, Aimster’s effort to avoid actual
knowledge (the nail in Napster’s coffin) did not save it from liability.74 In
addition, the court sought to simplify the Sony rule by analogizing
contributory infringement to the criminal concept of aiding and
abetting.75 Judge Posner explained, “To the recording industry, a single
known infringing use brands the facilitator as a contributory infringer. To
the Aimsters of this world, a single noninfringing use provides complete
immunity from liability. Neither is correct.”76 In Judge Posner’s view,
“[i]t is not enough . . . that a product or service be physically capable . . .
of [a] noninfringing use,”77 there must be evidence that the product or
service is “actually used for . . . the stated non-infringing purposes.”78
Aimster failed to provide any evidence of noninfringing uses. Because
Aimster could not satisfy the Seventh Circuit’s qualified Sony rule, the
court upheld the preliminary injunction.79

72

Id. at 648 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
438 (1984)) (“[T]he video recorder was being used for a mixture of infringing and
noninfringing uses and . . . . Sony could not demix them because once Sony sold the
recorder it lost all control over its use.”).
73
Id. at 648.
74
Id. at 650. Aimster used an encryption device to shield it from actual knowledge of
infringement. Id.
75
Id. at 651. Judge Posner noted:
There are analogies in the law of aiding and abetting, the criminal
counterpart to contributory infringement. A retailer of slinky dresses is not
guilty of aiding and abetting prostitution even if he knows that some of his
customers are prostitutes—he may even know which ones are. The extent to
which his activities and those of similar sellers actually promote prostitution
is likely to be slight relative to the social costs of imposing a risk of
prosecution on him. But the owner of a massage parlor who employs
women who are capable of giving massages, but in fact as he knows sell
only sex and never massages to their customers, is an aider and abettor of
prostitution (as well as being guilty of pimping or operating a brothel). The
slinky-dress case corresponds to Sony, and, like Sony, is not inconsistent
with imposing liability on the seller of a product or service that, as in the
massage-parlor case, is capable of noninfringing uses but in fact is used only
to infringe.
Id. (citations omitted).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 653.
78
Id. Judge Posner’s opinion is reminiscent of Judge Blackmun’s opinion in Sony.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 491 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the Sony court consistently used the words “capable
of.” Id. at 442 (majority opinion).
79
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653-56.
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Judge Posner’s opinion created a divergence between the Seventh
and Ninth Circuits.80 Each court sought to interpret the difficult Sony
language.81 Judge Posner quoted the Sony majority’s contradictory
language,82 but held in line with the Sony dissent.83 Shortly after Aimster,
the Ninth Circuit faced another contributory copyright infringement case
involving P2P software.84 In Grokster, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its
previous position contra the Seventh Circuit.85 Ultimately, Grokster,
which was appealed to the Supreme Court, deepened the split between
the circuits and provided no clarification of the Sony rule.
2. Grokster: Ninth Circuit to the Supreme Court86
This section discusses the most recent case concerning contributory
copyright infringement. Grokster is significant because it represents the
continuing circuit split as well as the new rule in contributory copyright
law. The Ninth Circuit, remaining true to precedent, decided not to join
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Sony.87 Plaintiffs appealed the
matter to the Supreme Court, which they asked to clarify the Sony rule.88
The Court, however, refused to revisit the Sony rule and failed to address
the circuit split.89 Instead, the Court issued a new inducement rule that
imposes liability on those who purposefully encourage infringement.90
Although the Court unanimously agreed with the application of the
inducement rule, the concurrences differed in their interpretation of the
Sony rule.91 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion gives a particularly
insightful discussion of the Sony rule.92 Thus, any discussion of
contributory copyright infringement requires an understanding of the
Grokster decision.
In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of Napster and Aimster, Grokster
and StreamCast (defendants) distributed free software that enabled users
to share files by way of P2P networks.93 “A user who downloads and
80
81

2001).
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id. at 649 (citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)).
Id. at 648; A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir.
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648.
Id. at 353.
Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9.
Id.
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2764.
Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9.
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778.
Id.
Id. at 2780.
Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2770 (majority opinion).
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installs either [defendant’s] software possesses the protocol to send
requests for files directly to the computers of others using [compatible]
software . . .”94 P2P networks are more secure, less costly, and more
efficient than other networks, because they operate without a central
server.95 These benefits have not gone unnoticed; in addition to the
defendants’ patrons, universities, governmental agencies, corporations,
and libraries utilize such networks.96 Although P2P networks are costeffective, the lack of a central server makes it difficult to monitor the
shared information and intercept the potentially illegal behavior of
users.97 As a result, the defendants’ users allegedly employed the P2P
networks for the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted music and video
files.98
A group of copyright holders (plaintiffs) sued the defendants for
contributory copyright infringement.99 The district court found that
software users who downloaded protected files directly infringed the
plaintiffs’ copyrights.100 Nevertheless, the court granted the defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to liability for contributory
infringement.101 The district court held that the distribution of the P2P
software “did not provide the distributors with actual knowledge of
specific acts of infringement.”102 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.103 It read Sony “as holding that distribution of a commercial
product capable of substantial noninfringing uses could not give rise to
contributory liability for infringement unless the distributor had actual
94

Id. at 2771.
Id. at 2770. Unlike Grokster, Napster and Aimster did not operate with true P2P
software; both companies operated with a central server. In re Aimster Copyright Litig.,
334 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
96
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
97
Id. at 2770 n.1.
98
Id. at 2770-71.
99
Id. at 2771. Despite the lack of an omniscient central server, the plaintiffs provided
impressive evidence, which showed that copyrighted material accounted for
approximately 90% of the files available on the defendants’ P2P networks. Id. at 2772.
The defendants, relying heavily on Sony, argued that P2P networks have substantial
noninfringing uses, including, but not limited to, the free distribution of musical works to
wider audiences as well as the free file sharing of unprotected works, like Shakespeare
and Supreme Court Case Briefs. Id. Furthermore, some copyright holders, such as Wilco,
authorized the file sharing of their work. Id. at 2784 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Id. at
2772 (majority opinion). The defendants’ revenue did not come from users of the free
software, but rather from the sale of advertisements streamed to users employing the
software: infringement was not their business. Id. at 2774.
100
Id. at 2774.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 2774.
95
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knowledge of specific instances of infringement and failed to act on that
knowledge.”104 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling differed dramatically from
Judge Posner’s Seventh Circuit opinion105 and, thus, deepened the split
between the circuits.106 The Supreme Court certified the question: “under
what circumstances [is] the distributor of a product capable of both
lawful and unlawful use . . . liable for acts of copyright infringement by
third parties using the product.”107
Justice Souter’s majority opinion began with a reaffirmation of the
Court’s duty to balance the interests of copyright owners against the
public’s interest in technological innovation.108 The Court then explained
that Sony “absolves the . . . conduct of selling an item with substantial
lawful as well as unlawful uses, and limits liability to instances of more
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will
be misused.”109 Despite the plaintiffs’ argument that a clear definition of
the term “substantial” was the key to the case, the Supreme Court
sidestepped the entire issue.110 “[T]he Court of Appeals misapplied
Sony,” the majority explained, because “[the] Ninth Circuit . . . read
Sony’s limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of
substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily
liable for third parties’ infringing use of it.”111 Justice Souter opined, “[i]t
is enough to note that the Ninth Circuit’s judgment rested on an
erroneous understanding of Sony and to leave further consideration of the
104

Id. at 2774-75.
The Ninth Circuit addressed this divergence directly: “[w]e are mindful that the
Seventh Circuit has read Sony’s substantial noninfringing use standard differently . . . .
Even if we were free to do so, we do not read [Sony]’s holding as narrowly as does the
Seventh Circuit.” Grokster I, 380 F.3d at 1162 n.9.
106
The circuits diverged regarding two aspects of contributory infringement as
outlined by Sony: knowledge and noninfringing uses. In Aimster, Judge Posner disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit’s rule that actual knowledge of specific acts of infringement was
necessary for liability. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003)
(citing 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)). Instead, the court
held that constructive knowledge was adequate to establish liability. Id. at 650. The
Seventh Circuit also held that “[i]t is not enough . . . that a product or service be
physically capable . . . of noninfringing use,” there must be evidence that the product or
service is “actually used for . . . the stated non-infringing purposes.” Id. at 653. In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that the Sony rule absolved distributors of liability
whenever their product or service was capable of substantial noninfringing use. Grokster,
125 S. Ct. at 2778.
107
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
108
Id. at 2775.
109
Id. at 2777-78.
110
Id. at 2778; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 457 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court has tended to evade the hard
issues when they arise in the area of copyright law.”).
111
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778. The Supreme Court did not expressly uphold the
Seventh Circuit’s standard nor did it note the circuit split.
105
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Sony rule for a day when that may be required.”112 The majority then
focused on the inducement claim and “[did] not revisit Sony further.”113
Once again, the Supreme Court looked to patent law for guidance
on a copyright case.114 The majority held that “one who distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.”115
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing
uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.
Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as
offering customers technical support or product updates, support
liability in themselves. The inducement rule, instead, premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and
thus does nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or
discourage innovation having a lawful promise.116

Applying this inducement rule to the facts presented, the majority
held that “summary judgment in favor of [the defendants] was error.”117
The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the matter
for further proceedings.118
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, imparted the concurring opinion that summary judgment was
inappropriate based on the software distribution as well as the active
inducement of infringement.119 Justice Ginsburg explained that
distributors may be liable as contributory infringers if their product lacks
“‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ noninfringing uses.”120
However, “there was no need in Sony to ‘give precise content to the
question of how much [actual or potential] use is commercially
significant.’”121 In Sony, Justice Ginsburg argued, the evidence of
112
Id. at 2778-79. Thus, the circuit split has not been resolved. Not only did the
Supreme Court fail to clarify the Sony rule, but it also failed to adopt the Seventh
Circuit’s position. Id. at 2778-80. Justice Souter’s opinion notes the Ninth Circuit’s
position on actual knowledge, but does not directly address it. Id. at 2774-75. Instead, the
Court simply stated that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony. Id. at 2778-79.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 2779.
115
Id. at 2780.
116
Id. (emphasis added).
117
Id. at 2782.
118
Id. at 2783.
119
Id. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
120
Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984)).
121
Id. at 2784 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 442).
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noninfringing uses was far greater than that presented in this case.122 The
Ninth Circuit erred because it relied heavily on declarations of
substantial noninfringing uses supplied by the defendants.123 Thus,
Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority, finding summary
judgment inappropriate.124
In response to Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, Justice Breyer, with
whom Justices Stevens and O’Connor joined, penned a separate
concurring opinion.125 Specifically, Justice Breyer disagreed with Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion that summary judgment was inappropriate based on
the P2P network’s capability of substantial noninfringing use.126 Though
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Ginsburg’s discussion of the Sony
rule, “the record evidence . . . convince[d] [him] that the Court of
Appeals’ conclusion ha[d] adequate legal support.”127
Justice Breyer noted that “[t]he [Sony] Court found that the
magnitude of authorized programming [a mere 9% of all television
programming] was ‘significant.’”128 Furthermore, Justice Breyer
explained, the Sony Court “also noted the ‘significant potential for future
authorized copying.’”129 “The [Sony] Court, in using the key word
‘substantial,’ indicated that [the authorized programming] constituted a
sufficient basis for rejecting the imposition of secondary liability.”130
With that in mind, Justice Breyer compared the facts in Sony to those
presented in Grokster.131 The number of files authorized for
122

Id. at 2785. The plaintiffs provided impressive evidence, which showed that
copyrighted material accounted for approximately 90% of the files available on the
defendants’ P2P networks. Id. at 2772 (majority opinion). The defendants disputed the
means of determining this finding as well as the implication. Id. To their detriment, the
defendants “concede[d] [to] infringement in most downloads.” Id. The defendants emailed directions, which outlined acts of direct infringement, to users. Id. The defendants
also seemed to encourage infringement though their advertising campaigns, which
targeted former Napster users with a penchant for copyright infringement. Id. at 2773.
The defendants made no effort to filter copyrighted material from users’ downloads, but
“aimed to have a larger number of copyrighted songs [such at Top 40 tracks] available on
their networks than other file-sharing networks.” Id. They sent e-mails to warn users
about copyright infringement, but never blocked anyone presumed to make illegal use of
their software. Id. at 2774.
123
Id. at 2785 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
124
Id. at 2785-86.
125
Id. 2787-96 (Breyer, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Stevens, who authored the
Sony opinion, joined Justice Breyer’s opinion.
126
Id. at 2787.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2788 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 444 (1984)).
129
Id. (emphasis added).
130
Id. at 2788.
131
Id.
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downloading, according to the plaintiffs’ expert, was 10%, a figure
remarkably similar to the amount of authorized programming in Sony.132
Thus, Justice Breyer opined, “it is reasonable to infer quantities of
current lawful use roughly approximate to those at issue in Sony.”133
In addition, Justice Breyer explained, “[Sony’s] . . . language . . .
suggest[s] that a figure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove
insufficient, but that such a figure serves as an adequate foundation
where there is a reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate uses over
time.”134 Justice Breyer then provided a lengthy discussion of the P2P
software’s future noninfringing uses.135 “As more and more
uncopyrighted information is stored in swappable form, it seems a likely
inference that lawful [P2P] sharing will become increasingly
prevalent.”136 Justice Breyer included a laundry list of up-and-coming
legitimate noninfringing uses for P2P software,137 but noted “[t]here may
be other now-unforeseen noninfringing uses that develop for [P2P]
software, just as the home-video rental industry (unmentioned in Sony)
developed for the VCR.”138 Granted, “[the defendants] may not want to
132
Id. at 2788-89. The defendants submitted evidence of free electronic books (from
project Gutenberg); authorized music downloads (from artists like Wilco, Pearl Jam,
Dave Matthews, and John Mayer); authorized clips from music videos as well as software
in the public domain in order to establish its current noninfringing uses. Id. Sony
proffered evidence from professional sports league officials, religious broadcasting
representatives, and Mr. Rogers to establish its current noninfringing uses. Sony, 464 U.S.
at 445-46.
133
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring).
134
Id. (citation omitted).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 2789-90.
137
Justice Breyer expounded:
[L]egitimate noninfringing uses are coming to include the swapping of:
research information (the initial purpose of many peer-to-peer networks);
public domain films (e.g., those owned by the Prelinger Archive); historical
recordings and digital educational materials (e.g., those stored on the
Internet Archive); digital photos (OurPictures, for example, is starting a P2P
photo-swapping service); “shareware” and “freeware” (e.g., Linux and
certain Windows software); secure licensed music and movie files (Intent
MediaWorks, for example, protects licensed content sent across P2P
networks); news broadcasts past and present (the BBC Creative Archive
lets users “rip, mix and share the BBC”); user-created audio and video files
(including “podcasts” that may be distributed through P2P software); and all
manner of free “open content” works collected by Creative Commons (one
can search for Creative Commons material on StreamCast). [Citation
omitted.] I can find nothing in the record that suggests that this course of
events will not continue to flow naturally as a consequence of the character
of the software taken together with the foreseeable development of the
Internet and of information technology.
Id. at 2790.
138
Id.
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develop these other noninfringing uses. But Sony’s standard seeks to
protect not the Groksters of this world . . ., but the development of
technology more generally.”139
Grokster is important, because the Court refused to revisit the Sony
140
rule. Instead, the Court established the inducement rule, which, unlike
the Sony rule, penalizes purposeful conduct resulting in infringement.141
Although the Court unanimously applied the inducement rule to the
defendants, the concurrences differed in their interpretation of the Sony
rule.142 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Stevens, the author of the Sony
rule, wrote a concurring opinion that carefully discussed the Sony rule
and provided explanation regarding the rule.143 Justice Breyer’s
discussion of the social benefits of P2P software is particularly important
to this comment.
II. COPYRIGHTS, TECHNOLOGY AND TORTS
This section develops copyright law’s dual objectives as well as its
origins in the Constitution. This section also establishes the links
between contributory copyright infringement and tort law. The theory of
contributory copyright liability “originates in tort law and stems from the
notion that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement should
be held accountable.”144 However, when a product or service is capable
of lawful and illegal uses, the “Sony[] rule limits imputing culpable
intent” to contribute to copyright infringement based on product
distribution.145 Just as the Sony Court was divided, the circuits split
regarding the application of the Sony rule.146 Recently, the Supreme
Court refused to provide guidance for the lower courts,147 and the
concurrences reveal a still divided Court.148 Thus, when another case
requires clarification of the Sony rule, the lower courts should look to tort
law for an explanation.
The United States Constitution explicitly grants Congress the
power: “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Id. at 2778 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2780.
Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779.
In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779.
Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”149 Copyright serves both
the private interests of the authors as well as the public interests of
American society. Although the monopoly granted by the Constitution to
authors provides a special reward, the goal is to enable others access to
this protected expression for inspiration in creating their own expression
and, thereby, promote knowledge.150 Because of these dual objectives,
“copyright protection has enjoyed a revered place in our national legal
system and in the development of the arts, sciences, the economy, and
industrialization of our nation.”151 The still-nascent Congress first
enacted copyright legislation in 1790.152 However, copyright law is not
an American invention; rather it is a constantly evolving descendent of
the British censorship laws.153 From the time of Guttenberg’s printing
press up to today, copyright law has developed hand in hand with the
advance of technology.154
Copyright law’s dual objectives require review whenever
technological innovation leaves the Copyright Act behind.155 The Sony
court aptly described this process as striking a “difficult balance between
the interests of authors . . . and society’s competing interest.”156 Although
Congress is the body empowered by the Constitution to enact copyright
legislation, the Supreme Court, through its power of interpretation, has
made the most recent adjustments to copyright law in the Grokster
opinion. The Court has been left with the task of striking the “difficult
149

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
CCC Information Services, Inc. v. MacLean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d
61, 68 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1953)) (“‘The economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful
Arts.’”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443
(1984)).
151
Dun & Bradstreet Software Serv., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197,
206 (3d Cir. 2002).
152
Id.
153
Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12 (citing Foreword to B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW
OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)) (“‘Copyright protection became necessary with the
invention of the printing press and had its early beginnings in the British censorship
laws.’”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480) (Justice Breyer noted, “[F]or all I know, the monks
had a fit when Gutenberg made his press.”).
154
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12 (citing Foreword to B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)).
155
Id. at 432 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
156
Id. at 429; see also Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775 (“The more artistic protection is
favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged; the administration of
copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade off.”).
150
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balance,” because those seeking swift relief and enforcement of their
rights often commence copyright infringement actions before Congress
can respond157 or as an alternative to congressional action.158
An owner of a valid copyright may sue a direct infringer for
copyright infringement if that infringer has copied elements of the
copyright holder’s work without permission.159 Direct infringers are
those persons who actually copied the original elements of a copyright
holder’s work without permission.160 It seems simple, but modern
technology continues to complicate matters. Today, Americans have
VCRs, DVRs, DVD burners, CD burners, and P2P networks at their
disposal. Thus, millions of unauthorized people can access and reproduce
copyrighted material with the greatest of ease; “it may be impossible to
enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct
infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the
distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of
contributory . . . infringement.”161
Despite the Supreme Court’s use of this theory, Congress did not
include contributory liability in the language of the Copyright Act.162
Instead, the Sony Court looked to patent law, which finds its beginnings
in the same constitutional clause as copyright law, to establish the theory.
Contributory infringement, however, is not a creation of patent law, but
tort law.163 “Contributory infringement originates in tort law and stems
157

Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
The inducement standard adopted in Grokster as well as the Court’s refusal to
revisit Sony may have been the Court’s effort to “split the baby” in light of the defeat of
the Inducing Infringements of Copyright Act, S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004). See
Christine Pope, iBrief, Unfinished Business: Are Today’s P2P Networks Liable for
Copyright Infringement?, 22 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶33 (2005),
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2005DLTR0022.pdf.
159
Dun & Bradstreet Software Serv., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197,
206 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d
Cir. 1986); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir.1993))
(“To establish a claim of copyright infringement [against a direct infringer], a plaintiff
must establish: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unauthorized copying of
original elements of the plaintiff’s work.”).
160
Sony, 464 U.S. at 433 (citing 17 U.S. C. § 501(a)) (“[A]nyone who trespasses into
[the copyright holder’s] exclusive domain by using . . . the copyrighted work . . . ‘is an
infringer of the copyright.’”); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir.
2003) (“[People] like to swap computer files containing popular music. If the music is
copyrighted, such swapping, which involves making and transmitting a digital copy of
the music, infringes copyright. The swappers . . . are the direct infringers.”).
161
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2776.
162
Id. (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 434).
163
See Fonovisa, Inc v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996); see
also In re Magnavox Co., 627 F.2d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[P]atent infringement is
generally considered to be a tort.”).
158
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from the notion that one who directly contributes to another’s
infringement should be held accountable.”164 Accordingly, ‘“one who,
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a
‘contributory’ infringer.”165
As evinced by Sony, plaintiffs may reasonably believe that the
marketing and distribution of a product with some infringing uses are
means of contributing to direct infringement. The Supreme Court
disagreed and, as the Court elucidates in Grokster, the “Sony[] rule limits
imputing culpable intent”166 to contributorily infringe based on product
distribution, if a product (such as the VCR or P2P software) has
substantial noninfringing uses.167 Since its pronouncement, the Sony rule
has caused some difficulty. Though the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s holding, the Grokster Court refused to further clarify the Sony
rule or even address the circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.168 Instead, the Court introduced a new rule and left the lingering
questions surrounding substantiality of noninfringing uses for another
day.169 The lower courts must now distill the murky waters: what is the
meaning of “substantial?” The tort law definition of intent provides some
much needed clarity.
III. SONY, SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY AND THE BALANCE
This section uses tort law to clarify the Sony rule. First, this section
provides a detailed discussion of the Restatement’s definition of intent.
Just as the Restatement bifurcates intent in tort law,170 Sony and Grokster
provide two situations in which a defendant may possess the intent to
contribute to direct infringement.171 The comments accompanying the
Restatement’s definition limit its scope.172 In certain situations,

164

Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264 (emphasis added).
Id.
166
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added).
167
See Christopher Norgaard, The Supreme Court Shares its Intent: Grokster’s
Misplaced Pronouncements on Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement, 70 PAT.,
TRADEMARK, & COPYRIGHT J. 545 (2005) (“A product’s capability of noninfringing use . .
. is relevant only when there is no direct evidence of inducement or encouragement. In
other words, when a product’s only realistic and reasonable use is for infringement . . .
the . . . distribution of the product induces and encourages the infringement.”).
168
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
169
Id. at 2780.
170
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
171
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
172
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e
165
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illustrated by the examples listed in the comments,173 a defendant “may
be engaging in a generally proper activity for generally proper reasons,
even though the activity produces harm as an unavoidable but unwanted
byproduct.”174 In such instances, the Restatement limits those
defendants’ liability unless their conduct will affect a particular victim or
a small class of victims in a localized area.175 This limitation focuses
liability on those who evince a blameworthy intent.176 In addition, the
substantial certainty limitation creates a balancing test akin to tort law’s
negligence standard.177 Thus, the Restatement suggests that, if a
defendant’s conduct provides a net social benefit despite a substantial
certainty of some harmful consequences, liability should be limited.178
This limitation, when applied to contributory copyright infringement,
will balance the interests of copyright holders and society.
A. The Restatement on Intent
Section one of the Restatement (Third) of Torts179 explains that “[a]
person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) The person
has the purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) The person knows
to a substantial certainty that the consequence will ensue from the
person’s conduct.”180 Although this is not a new concept, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts clearly bifurcates the intent requirement for
intentional torts.181 Similarly, the Supreme Court decisions in both Sony
and Grokster provide two situations in which a manufacturer/software
provider may possess the culpable intent for contributory
infringement.182 Grokster imposes liability on those who induce

173

Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a.
175
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e.
176
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes.
177
See id.
178
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e.
179
The Restatement is a publication of the American Law Institute (ALI), which is an
organization comprised of prominent members of the legal profession. ARTHUR BEST &
DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND PROBLEMS 18 (Aspen
Publishers 2003). It is not binding law, but a model designed to standardize state laws
across the country. Id. Though the Restatement (Third) of Torts is still a draft, it carries
the weight of the ALI’s prestige; thus, it is highly persuasive. Id.
180
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (emphasis added).
181
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (defining a similar, yet
blended, definition of intent that focuses on two mind states).
182
The Supreme Court is not the only body to adopt a seemingly bifurcated definition
of intent in the copyright context. In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), which provides a variety of additional protections for certain
copyright holders, who utilize protective technological devices. As outlined by the
174
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infringement or distribute their product for the purpose of promoting
infringement.183 The language of the rule calls to mind the Restatement’s
first intent prong: purpose/desire. On the other hand, the distribution of a
product, if a company knows to a substantial certainty that infringement
will ensue from that distribution, results in contributory liability.184 This
section will show that Sony, despite its rather cumbersome language,
represents the second intent prong.185
In addition to defining intent, the Restatement makes many careful
qualifications concerning that definition. The drafters specifically note
the obvious differences between desire and substantial certainty.186 The
drafters also argue that actions taken with the purpose to produce a
harmful consequence evince a culpable desire state.187 However,
substantial certainty is a grey area. Just because one has substantial
additional violations under DMCA, Congress also employs a two-pronged intent
standard:
(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or
otherwise traffic in technology, product, service, device, component, or part
thereof, that
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of
circumventing [encryption and protective devices used by the
copyright holders to protect their work];
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent [encryption and protective devices
used by the copyright holders to protect their work] . . . .
17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2000 & Supp. 2005). The language of subsection A
implicates those with a guilty mind and the language of sub-section B is remarkably
similar to the Sony rule and its focus on “substantial noninfringing uses.”
183
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2780.
184
The Court specifically states, “Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent,” which
calls to mind the language of the Restatement’s discussion of intent. Grokster, 125 S. Ct.
at 2779; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984) (“[T]he sale of copying equipment . . . does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.
Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”); see also Norgaard,
supra note 167. With regard to the circuit split, the Restatement only requires
“knowledge.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). Given
Sony’s silence on the issue and the Grokster ruling against the Ninth Circuit, it may be
safe to say that constructive knowledge is adequate.
185
The Court’s language seems to incorporate both the substantial certainty theory as
well as its limitation in one rule, which makes it difficult to decipher without the aid of
the Restatement. This difficulty may have led to the circuit split as well as the Court’s
reluctance to revisit the rule.
186
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a. (“There are obvious differences
between the actor who acts with the desire to cause harm and the actor who engages in
conduct knowing that harm is substantially certain to happen. There is a clear element of
wrongfulness in conduct whose very purpose is to cause harm . . . .”).
187
Id. (“When an actor chooses to engage in conduct with knowledge that harm is
certain to follow, this choice, with its known consequence, provides a distinctive
argument in favor of liability.”).
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certainty that his actions will produce a harmful consequence does not
necessarily mean that he has the culpable desire to produce those
results.188 In fact, despite his substantial certainty, “the actor . . . may be
engaging in a generally proper activity for generally proper reasons,
even though the activity produces harm as an unavoidable but unwanted
byproduct.”189 Such a proper activity may be the operation of a
railroad190 or the construction of a high rise building.191 Thus, the drafters
limit the application of the substantial certainty standard when the
victims are not contained in a small class or within a localized area or
when the period between cause and effect becomes too great.192

188

Id. (“[T]here are complications in considering the liability implications of harms
that are intentional only in the sense that the actor who engages in conduct knows that
harm is substantially certain to result.”).
189
Id. (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. c (“[A]
mere showing that harm is substantially certain to result from the actor’s conduct is not
sufficient to prove intent; it must also be shown that the actor is aware of this.”).
190
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt a (1965)) (“[D]espite the inevitability of
serious injuries caused by railroads, a railroad company is not negligent for merely
running the railroad.”).
191
Section One comment e states:
[I]n many situations a defendant’s knowledge of substantially certain harms
is entirely consistent with the absence of any liability in tort. For example,
an owner of land, arranging for the construction of a high-rise building, can
confidently predict that some number of workers will be seriously injured
in the course of the construction project; the company that runs a railroad
can be sure that railroad operations will over time result in a significant
number of serious personal injuries; the manufacturer of knives can easily
predict that a certain number of person’s using its knives will inadvertently
cut themselves. Despite their knowledge, these actors do not intentionally
cause the injuries that result. Moreover, despite their knowledge, none of the
companies – absent further facts – can ever be found guilty of negligence . .
..
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e.
192
In addition,
The application[] of the substantial certainty test should be limited to
situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty
that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone
within a small class of potential victims within a localized area. The test
loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential victims becomes
vaguer, and when in a related way the time frame involving the actor’s
conduct expands and the causal sequence connecting conduct and harm
becomes more complex . . . .
Id.
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B. The Substantial Certainty Limitation
The substantial certainty limitation creates a balancing test for the
protection and promotion of industries serving the public good.193
Although the Restatement does not expressly state it as such, the
industrial examples support this theory.194 Furthermore, the substantial
certainty limitation seems inspired, at least in part, by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts’ discussion of negligence.195 For example, the
Restatement explains that “[t]he operation of railways and other public
utilities, no matter how carefully carried on, produces accidents which . .
. harm many people but the risk involved in the operation is more than
counterbalanced by the service which they render the public.”196 Thus,
the Restatement weighs the harm substantially certain to occur against
the public benefits derived from that industry’s operation.
Even prior to the Restatement, the courts considered such a
limitation on liability to be sound public policy. For instance, in Beatty v.
Central Iowa Railroad, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a lower court
decision that absolved the railroad of guilt for the wrongful death of the
plaintiff, whose horse spooked along a highway parallel to the railroad
tracks.197 The court found that the construction of railroad tracks near a
major roadway was not an act of negligence, because the public interest
in the progress of technology and the promotion of intercommunication
outweighed the other factors in favor of liability.198 Similarly, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska provided a lengthy policy discussion in a
turntable (attractive nuisance) case.199 The Nebraska Supreme Court
opined:
The business of life is better carried forward by the use of
dangerous machinery; hence the public good demands its use,
although occasionally such use results in the loss of life or limb.
It does so because the danger is insignificant, when weighed
against the benefits resulting from the use of such machinery, and
193

The Restatement limits liability for certain industries “because it is believed that
the whole community benefits by it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt. a
(1965).
194
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e.
195
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e, reporter’s notes.
196
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt. a (1965).
197
12 N.W. 332 (Iowa 1882).
198
Id. at 334 (“Railways, if constructed at all, must of necessity, cross over highways.
. . . All persons must accept the advantages of this mode of intercommunication with the
danger and inconveniences which necessarily attend it; the price of progress cannot be
withheld.”).
199
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Krayenbuhl, 91 N.W. 880, 882 (Neb. 1902)
(“‘[T]he business of life must go forward;’ the means by which it is carried forward
cannot be rendered absolutely safe.”).
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for the same reason demands its reasonable, most effective and
unrestricted use, up to the point where the benefits resulting from
such use no longer outweigh the danger to be anticipated from it.
At that point the public good demands restrictions.200

Both of these courts balance the costs and benefits of operating a
railroad in order to determine negligence: the cost of operating a railroad
is outweighed by the social benefits derived from that industry. The ALR
found this analysis persuasive when drafting the Restatement (Third)
and, consequently, adopted it as the substantial certainty limitation. Thus,
when a defendant’s (an industry or software provider) conduct provides a
net social benefit despite a substantial certainty of some harmful
consequences, the courts should limit the defendant’s liability.
Another justification for the substantial certainty limitation is the
argument that “[d]esire-states . . . usually express culpability much more
directly than belief-states do . . . . [W]hen belief is blameworthy, it is
usually because the belief is strong evidence of some blameworthy
desire-state.”201 For example, companies do not desire their railroads to
cause serious bodily injury; they operate for the profitable purpose of
transporting people and goods. Serious injury does not advance those
goals. In addition, a subconscious desire to cause personal injury does
not form the foundation of that certainty, rather the company’s
pragmatism results in a general understanding that personal injury is
likely to result from the operation of a railroad.202 On the other hand,
assume an entity engages in conduct it knows to a substantial certainty
will cause the serious injury or death of an employee, “a particular
victim, or . . . someone within a small class of potential victims within a
localized area.”203 That company/person is liable, because their
200

Id. at 882-83.
Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 496 (1992);
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (“There are
obvious differences between the actor who acts with the desire to cause harm and the
actor who engages in conduct knowing that harm is substantially certain to happen. There
is a clear element of wrongfulness in conduct whose very purpose is to cause harm . . . ”).
202
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292, cmt. a (1965); See generally Shaw v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 973 F. Supp. 539, 548 (D. Md. 1997) (“While [a
tobacco company] may have had knowledge that second-hand smoke would reach some
non-smokers, the Court finds that such generalized knowledge is insufficient to satisfy
the intent requirement for battery.”); see also Pechan v. DynaPro, Inc., 622 N.E.2d 108,
117-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“[T]he act of smoking is not performed generally with the
intent to ‘touch’ nonsmokers with second-hand smoke.”).
203
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446 (1984) (“[I]n an action for contributory
infringement against the seller of copying equipment, the copyright holder may not
prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his programs, or unless he speaks for
virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome.”) (emphasis added).
201
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knowledge is not general but reveals a more blameworthy mental state.204
Thus, the substantial certainty limitation ensures that only those
people/entities that demonstrate a clear intent (established by their
purpose or knowledge) will face liability.
C. Substantial Certainty Applied to Contributory Copyright Infringement
In Grokster, the plaintiffs sought a clarification of the Sony rule, but
the Court refused to provide one.205 The explanations provided by the
Restatement clarify that rule and the substantial certainty limitation
provides a point of balance between the interests of copyright owners
and the public’s interest in technological innovation. For example, if a
product has no conceivable use but copyright infringement, the company
that markets and produces that product will be held liable.206 At the other
extreme, if a product has only noninfringing uses, the company that
markets and produces that product will never be liable. The problem, as
revealed by the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s reluctance to
address the issue, comes about when a product or service is capable of
both infringing and noninfringing uses. In those cases, the pragmatic
software engineer or inventor will know to a substantial certainty that his
product will, at some point, be used by another to infringe. However, just
as a railroad may escape liability for personal injuries substantially
certain to occur, the distributor of such a product may also escape
liability by way of the substantial certainty limitation.
The substantial certainty limitation should not be confused with an
exemption. Instead, it is a net through which the courts may filter those
cases that fall into the gray area between the two extremes. The
substantial certainty limitation is a balancing test; if an industry knows to
a substantial certainty that its operation could result in harm, the court
weighs that knowledge against the public benefits that industry provides.
If the industry provides a net social benefit, it should enjoy limited
204

See Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Comm., Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 699 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994) (“[W]hen [the defendant] intentionally blew cigar smoke in [the plaintiff]’s face,
under Ohio common law, he committed a battery.”).
205
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2778 (“[W]e do not revist Sony further, as MGM requests,
to add a more quantified description of the point of balance between protection and
commerce when liability rests solely on distribution with knowledge that unlawful use
will occur.”).
206
As the Court notes, “[W]here an article is ‘good for nothing else’ but infringement,
there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice
in presuming or imputing an intent to infringe.” Id. (citing Canda v. Michigan Malleable
Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903)). Similarly, such activity is encompassed by the
Restatement’s discussion of intent. Certainly one who develops and distributes a product
only capable of harmful consequences evinces either a purpose to cause harm or the
knowledge to a substantial certainty that such harms will come about.
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liability. However, the limitation does not allow all industries to escape
liability, nor does it allow all producers of products and services capable
of infringement to escape liability as a contributory infringer. The
limitation promises that certain software companies may escape liability,
while others may not. The difficulty has always been deciding where to
draw the line between the interests of copyright holders and the public’s
interest in technological innovation. The substantial certainty limitation,
thus, eases the “difficult balance.”207
In some cases, a company, like Sony, or the proprietor of P2P
networks, such as BearShare, Limewire, eDonkey, iMesh, eMule, and
BitTorrent, may analogize to those industries and instances noted in the
Restatement. P2P networks provide a public service. Like the railroad
and airline industries, which facilitate the free flow of commerce and
communication on a national and global scale, P2P networks facilitate
the free flow of trade and ideas on a global scale.208 Many corporations
utilize P2P networks.209 Due to reduced transaction costs, entrepreneurs,
previously excluded from the global market, now have access.210 Justice
Breyer’s concurring opinion also specifically lists many of P2P
networks’ uses that promote communication.211 In addition to the public
benefits, copyright owners may profit from this technology. Artists, who
otherwise may have had a smaller audience, can now reach an Internetsavvy global community.212 Furthermore, as Justice Breyer noted,
“[t]here may be other now-unforeseen noninfringing uses that develop
for [P2P] software, just as the home-video rental industry (unmentioned
in Sony) developed for the VCR.”213 In light of these social benefits, the
proprietors of P2P networks may qualify for the substantial certainty
limitation; technological innovation will not be chilled.
Nevertheless, the limitation does not save industries that know to a
substantial certainty that their conduct may harm specific victims or
207

Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
See Timothy K. Andrews, Comment, Control Content, Not Innovation: Why
Hollywood Should Embrace Peer-to-Peer Technology Despite the MGM v. Grokster
Battle, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 383, 410 (2004).
209
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
210
Andrews, supra note 208, at 410-11 (citing Brief of Appellee Grokster, Ltd. at 1820, MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 03-55894
and No. 03-55901)).
211
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
212
See id. at 2789 (noting Grokster’s network included “[a]uthorized copies of music
by artists such as Wilco, Janis Ian, Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews, John Mayer, and others”);
see also Andrews, supra note 208, at 411 (“[W]hen AOL Time Warner’s Reprise
Records refused to release the album Yankee Hotel Foxtrot by the band Wilco, the band
turned to P2P and distributed its album free of charge. . . . Soon after, Wilco signed with
Nonesuch Records . . . and the album went gold on May 20, 2003.”).
213
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring).
208
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persons in a localized area. This distinction furthers the goals of the
substantial certainty limitation. Rather than punishing pragmatism, the
limitation focuses liability on those who evince a subconscious,
blameworthy desire to cause harm. The proprietors of P2P networks may
have knowledge to a substantial certainty that their software will
facilitate the infringement of particular copyright holders’ work. For
example, in Grokster and Aimster, the defendants listed Top 40 tracks for
download.214 The Napsters, Groksters, and Aimsters of the world are
substantially certain, based on the popularity of those songs, that users
will download Top 40 songs without thinking of the royalties lost to the
copyright holder. Their certainty has a clear element of wrongfulness,
unlike that of the railroad industry, Sony, or even other software
providers. According to the substantial certainty limitation, those
software distributors are thus liable as contributory copyright infringers.
Of course, only the particular copyright holders, within that small class
of victims, could take action against the software provider. Thus, the
interests of the copyright holders counterbalance against the social
interest in technological innovation.
Ultimately, when applying the Restatement’s theory of intent as
well as its limitations to contributory copyright infringement, two
scenarios result in liability. One, which should be familiar, occurs when
an entity purposefully induces copyright infringement. The Supreme
Court provided a laundry list of questionable conduct committed by the
defendants in Grokster.215 Although the Court did not decide the facts of
the case, it hinted that such conduct equated to purposeful inducement.216
The proprietor of a P2P network, such as Grokster, does not escape
liability in that context and the interests of the copyright holders are
served. The second scenario comes about when an entity distributes a
product (or provides a service) capable of both infringing and
noninfringing uses. In the latter instance, the substantial certainty
limitation focuses liability on entities with a culpable mind state. First,
the question is whether “the defendant has knowledge to a substantial
certainty that [its] conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or
to someone within a small class of potential victims.”217 If the answer is
yes, then the analysis stops and the defendant faces liability based on its
intent to cause harm. If the answer is no, the court must balance the
social benefits derived from the product against the harm it produces. If
214
Id. at 2774 (majority opinion); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 64546 (7th Cir. 2003).
215
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
216
Id. at 2782.
217
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
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the product or service creates a net social benefit, the court should limit
liability: society’s interest in technological innovation is served. If the
product or service does not, the court must impose liability: copyright
holders are protected. Thus, the substantial certainty limitation clarifies
the Sony rule for the courts entrusted with the duty of balancing artists’
and society’s competing interests.
CONCLUSION
In the future, when faced with the need to clarify the Sony rule, the
lower courts should look to tort law and apply the substantial certainty
limitation, because it provides the balance between the public’s interest
in technological innovation and the rights of copyright holders. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the need to balance those
interests and recently entrusted that duty with the lower courts. The
substantial certainty limitation does not resolve the split between the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, because only action by Congress or the
Supreme Court can correct that divergence. The substantial certainty
limitation, however, clarifies the Sony rule for the lower courts not bound
by precedent. It focuses liability on those who evince a blameworthy
intent to cause harm and protects those industries that support the public
interest. Applying the substantial certainty limitation, the court should
ask two questions. First, the court must ask if “the defendant has
knowledge to a substantial certainty that [its] conduct will bring about
harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small class of
potential victims.”218 If the answer is yes, than the defendant is culpable
and must face liability. If the answer is no, a court must balance the
social benefits derived from the product against the harm it produces. If
the product or service creates a net social benefit, a court should limit
liability: society’s interest in technological innovation should be served.
If the product or service does not, the court must impose liability:
copyright holders should be protected. Ultimately, the substantial
certainty limitation provides the clarification of the Sony rule that has
been lacking for twenty years.

218

Id.

